Essentially, I've been trying to figure out what's actually in this bill and what it will all mean. Indirectly, of course. That is, I'm only assessing the assessments. It's not like I get paid for this. So anyway, here is my tremendously unsatisfying analysis: it is impossible to know what it will all mean.
If you've read any other commentaries on the bill so far, you've probably come across this same conclusion. By and large, what the bill sets about to do is to repair, tweak, and lubricate the American financial regulatory machine. Congress, it can be said, has given the bureaucracy a whole new set of fancy tools. What the bill does not really specify in most cases is how (or even whether) those tools get used.
So how does one interpret this? One could very easily don the rose-colored glasses and imagine a future in which this regulatory machine is manned (or in a particular news-grabby case, womaned) by those who both know and want to run it at full capacity. Or one can with, unfortunately, a much tamer imagination, don the glasses of recent history (which are certainly not rose, but beige, and flecked with the crystallized salt streaks of teary disappointment), and imagine a not so different future in which regulators ignore all the buttons upon their re-vamped console except for the one labeled "auto-pilot."
So here are some specifics (the sources I used are all at the bottom):
- First of all, and probably most consequentially, a new panel (the Financial Services Oversight Council) will be set up to figure out exactly which financial institutions fall under the new regulations and which do not (that is, which are "systematically important"). It will also review the overall stability of the global financial system. Presumably this crack team of top regulators will be able to identify problems as they arise and then act upon them in some such way. Kind of the like the Fed was always expected to.
- New regulations on capital levels (the quantity and quality of readily accessible "cash" banks have to hold on hand for a rainy, or panicky, day) are going to be implemented, the bill assures us. They will be drawn up by a panel of regulators who will presumably know what it is they're doing. No absolute numbers included, but current levels are set as a floor (and interestingly, the levels, the new law states, should expand and contract with economic activity.)
- Banks with government guarantees are restricted in the degree to which they can invest their own money for the financial return of the bank itself (this is the Volker rule); that is, acting like a hedge fund. The restriction is fairly liberal though (so I've read anyway), so the effect might be minimal.
- A new set of head-slappingly obvious but (maybe necessarily) vague restrictions are placed on the mortgage industry (e.g. you can't lend someone money if you aren't reasonably convinced he or she can pay you back).
- The ability of the government to seize, chop up, and liquidate problem institutions will be expanded to include non-banks. Which non-banks? Presumably companies like AIG and Lehman Brothers were in mind when this provision was put in, but I'm not sure. I've tried to figure it out. Either way, in the event that a "systematically important financial institution" has to get seized, the pool of money required to pay off their debts is not pre-funded, but may be borrowed from the Treasury, to be repaid subsequently by the financial industry as a whole with one-off, retroactive tax. Kablamo.
- A Consumer Financial Protection Agency is set-up. How much it does and how effectively it does it all depends on who the regulators are. It's potential authority seems broad, as far as I can tell though. A Tea Party's Czar to end all Tea Party Czars.
- Securitization is rationalized slightly. Any bank that tries to pawn off that hottest new pool of mortgages has to keep 5% of the thing on its books. This could potentially be a pretty big deal, though a major exemption exists for "qualified residential mortgages." Who makes the determination? The ever-watchful regulators, obviously.
- Rating Agencies, rather than being allowed to issue their ratings as opinions and thus under the protection of the 1st Amendment, are made liable. In other words, they might actually have to start doing their jobs. There are already some aftershocks on this one.
- Any firm that enters into a derivative contract will be forced to set aside some collateral and extra case, "just in case." Standard derivatives will be forced through clearinghouses (where an independent body makes sure both sides of each deal have their ducks in order) and then (as far as I can tell) onto an exchange of some sort (where the price of each standardized contract will be public to anyone. As for the riskier types of derivatives, regulated banks and non-banks will not be able to hold them directly. Instead, the interested party will have to set up a separate (isolated, funding, financial and legal liability wise) corporation, which it must nestle upon a pillow of "just in case" cash. All in all, this could be pretty good except for the fact that key terms such as "risky," "standard," "independent," and "appropriate collateral" will all be determined by...you guessed it...regulators.
So to re-articulate: the new regulatory order really has both the potential to surprise and to disappoint. And yet I worry. Finger-wagging ever impatient libs who seem only too eager to knit-pick Congress' latest Obama-approved watered-down compromise, Matthew Yglesias reminds us that "this regulatory setup, like all regulatory setups, only works if the regulators want it to work and that only happens if politicians want the regulators to want it to work."
Sure. A law only gets enforced if the cop wants it enforced. But why leave so much discretion to the cop?