Public Opinion and the Flotilla

I want to start from a relatively contentious place, in order to make I think a less contentious point. Let's say, for my sake, that the world we exist in is not one where either Israel or Palestine can ever really be proven to be right or wrong in any given situation. There are many intangibles, justifications and provocations abound, and for all intents and purposes there are two separate and highly distinct histories of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Between these two histories is a spectrum upon which the rest of the world sits - a multitude of shaded and nuanced takes on what has transpired in this one fairly small part of the world over the last couple millenia. These takes, as an aggregate, matter a great deal to the fate of the conflict - they dictate which side receives aid, foreign sympathy, and political clout to maneuver for its preferred outcome.

Now, some of these perspectives are immutable, and some may be more important than others on a strategic level, but I would argue that a sizable portion are still fluid. Israel built up a lot of international goodwill through the late 20th century, and Jewish communities around the world have lobbied effectively for some time to keep a lot of support on their side. Assuming, for the sake of this exercise, that this is a zero-sum conflict*, one would think that it was in Israel's best interest to work assiduously to push this window as far as possible in their direction. In that sense, a rational-thinking Israel would assess its Palestine policies in two ways: one, are they advancing our goals, and two, are they helping to create a favourable environment to do so?

We've already discussed, at length, the public image nightmare that the flotilla attack presents for Israel. As Ben pointed out, even those who are comfortable with the WHAT of the situation are going to have a hard time with the HOW. But bad shit happens, and while it may be difficult to pull off, one could see a lot of political upside to a stance of public contrition by Netanyahu and his government. Instead, we get this:

When Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu delivered his angry response to a cascade of international condemnation of Israel on Wednesday, he spoke first in Hebrew to a domestic Israeli audience. Choosing to address his home constituency, rather than the broader world, was a sign of his continued willingness to accept international ire as the price of upholding policies that are broadly supported at home...

"Once again, Israel faces hypocrisy and a biased rush to judgment. I'm afraid this isn't the first time,'' he said.

This is really, really, really the wrong tack to take. Especially now, as Israel is slowly decoupling from what once was its strongest ally abroad: American Jews.

Among American Jews today, there are a great many Zionists, especially in the Orthodox world, people deeply devoted to the State of Israel. And there are a great many liberals, especially in the secular Jewish world, people deeply devoted to human rights for all people, Palestinians included. But the two groups are increasingly distinct. Particularly in the younger generations, fewer and fewer American Jewish liberals are Zionists; fewer and fewer American Jewish Zionists are liberal. One reason is that the leading institutions of American Jewry have refused to foster—indeed, have actively opposed—a Zionism that challenges Israel’s behavior in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and toward its own Arab citizens. For several decades, the Jewish establishment has asked American Jews to check their liberalism at Zionism’s door, and now, to their horror, they are finding that many young Jews have checked their Zionism instead.

The New York Review of Books published that article on May 12, two weeks before the attack even occurred. It focuses on a group to which exactly one half of this blog belongs, and it's right, if a little hyperbolic. As Israel turns inwards on itself, rejecting all criticism from abroad (even from its friends) as hostility, it will start to cede ground in the public sphere. By refusing to address the flotilla in a responsible, honest way, Israel is doing more than its share of work to push away those groups abroad that could do it the most good.

In other words, the window of public opinion is closing fast. What makes the flotilla assault so terrible and so frightening is that it's simply going make it close even faster.

* There are some caveats here. One, this would imply that Israel and Palestine at all times would pursue the wisest courses to their end goals. Two, it implies that they are coherent entities with coherent goals. Three, it assumes that these goals are mutually exclusive and thus necessitate conflict. I don't really believe any of these things, I just want a simpler model to work with when discussing this absurdly complex situation.